{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/the-secret-revealer-generative-model-1","title":"The Secret Revealer: Generative Model-Inversion Attacks Against Deep Neural Networks","arxiv_id":"1911.07135","date":"2019-11-17","proceeding":"CVPR 2020 6","authors":["Yuheng Zhang","Ruoxi Jia","Hengzhi Pei","Wenxiao Wang","Bo Li","Dawn Song"],"abstract":"This paper studies model-inversion attacks, in which the access to a model is abused to infer information about the training data. Since its first introduction, such attacks have raised serious concerns given that training data usually contain privacy-sensitive information. Thus far, successful model-inversion attacks have only been demonstrated on simple models, such as linear regression and logistic regression. Previous attempts to invert neural networks, even the ones with simple architectures, have failed to produce convincing results. We present a novel attack method, termed the generative model-inversion attack, which can invert deep neural networks with high success rates. Rather than reconstructing private training data from scratch, we leverage partial public information, which can be very generic, to learn a distributional prior via generative adversarial networks (GANs) and use it to guide the inversion process. 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