{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/salsa-picante-a-machine-learning-attack-on","title":"SALSA PICANTE: a machine learning attack on LWE with binary secrets","arxiv_id":"2303.04178","date":"2023-03-07","proceeding":null,"authors":["Cathy Li","Jana Sotáková","Emily Wenger","Mohamed Malhou","Evrard Garcelon","Francois Charton","Kristin Lauter"],"abstract":"Learning with Errors (LWE) is a hard math problem underpinning many proposed post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) systems. The only PQC Key Exchange Mechanism (KEM) standardized by NIST is based on module~LWE, and current publicly available PQ Homomorphic Encryption (HE) libraries are based on ring LWE. The security of LWE-based PQ cryptosystems is critical, but certain implementation choices could weaken them. One such choice is sparse binary secrets, desirable for PQ HE schemes for efficiency reasons. Prior work, SALSA, demonstrated a machine learning-based attack on LWE with sparse binary secrets in small dimensions ($n \\le 128$) and low Hamming weights ($h \\le 4$). However, this attack assumes access to millions of eavesdropped LWE samples and fails at higher Hamming weights or dimensions. We present PICANTE, an enhanced machine learning attack on LWE with sparse binary secrets, which recovers secrets in much larger dimensions (up to $n=350$) and with larger Hamming weights (roughly $n/10$, and up to $h=60$ for $n=350$). We achieve this dramatic improvement via a novel preprocessing step, which allows us to generate training data from a linear number of eavesdropped LWE samples ($4n$) and changes the distribution of the data to improve transformer training. We also improve the secret recovery methods of SALSA and introduce a novel cross-attention recovery mechanism allowing us to read off the secret directly from the trained models. While PICANTE does not threaten NIST's proposed LWE standards, it demonstrates significant improvement over SALSA and could scale further, highlighting the need for future investigation into machine learning attacks on LWE with sparse binary secrets.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.04178v4","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2303.04178v4.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"salsa-picante-a-machine-learning-attack-on","repo_url":"https://github.com/facebookresearch/verde","is_official":0,"mentioned_in_paper":0,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"pytorch","reach":null}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"math","task_name":"Math"}],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":"https://syntology.ai/paper/2303.04178","atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2303.04178","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":true,"reason":"arxiv_id_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"agent_calls":[{"tool":"get_citation_path","arguments":{"paper_1":"2303.04178"},"arguments_in":{"paper_2":"another paper's arXiv id or title"},"call":"get_citation_path(paper_1=\"2303.04178\", paper_2=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_concepts_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2303.04178"},"call":"get_concepts_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2303.04178\")"}],"by_repo":[{"repo":"facebookresearch/verde","kind":"listed","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0,"harvested_for_other_papers":1,"harvested_for":["2306.11641"],"harvested_for_calls":[{"arxiv_id":"2306.11641","tool":"get_harvested_code_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2306.11641"},"call":"get_harvested_code_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2306.11641\")"}]}],"by_repo_harvested_for_is":"harvested_for: the arXiv ids (as Syntology's graph holds them) of every paper whose samples Syntology's graph links to this repository, in arXiv-id order, complete; the page names the first 3 and says how many more. 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