{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/reinforce-adversarial-attacks-on-large","title":"REINFORCE Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models: An Adaptive, Distributional, and Semantic Objective","arxiv_id":"2502.17254","date":"2025-02-24","proceeding":null,"authors":["Simon Geisler","Tom Wollschläger","M. H. I. Abdalla","Vincent Cohen-Addad","Johannes Gasteiger","Stephan Günnemann"],"abstract":"To circumvent the alignment of large language models (LLMs), current optimization-based adversarial attacks usually craft adversarial prompts by maximizing the likelihood of a so-called affirmative response. An affirmative response is a manually designed start of a harmful answer to an inappropriate request. While it is often easy to craft prompts that yield a substantial likelihood for the affirmative response, the attacked model frequently does not complete the response in a harmful manner. Moreover, the affirmative objective is usually not adapted to model-specific preferences and essentially ignores the fact that LLMs output a distribution over responses. If low attack success under such an objective is taken as a measure of robustness, the true robustness might be grossly overestimated. To alleviate these flaws, we propose an adaptive and semantic optimization problem over the population of responses. We derive a generally applicable objective via the REINFORCE policy-gradient formalism and demonstrate its efficacy with the state-of-the-art jailbreak algorithms Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). 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