{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/quantifying-identifiability-to-choose-and","title":"Quantifying identifiability to choose and audit $ε$ in differentially private deep learning","arxiv_id":"2103.02913","date":"2021-03-04","proceeding":null,"authors":["Daniel Bernau","Günther Eibl","Philip W. Grassal","Hannah Keller","Florian Kerschbaum"],"abstract":"Differential privacy allows bounding the influence that training data records have on a machine learning model. To use differential privacy in machine learning, data scientists must choose privacy parameters $(\\epsilon,\\delta)$. Choosing meaningful privacy parameters is key, since models trained with weak privacy parameters might result in excessive privacy leakage, while strong privacy parameters might overly degrade model utility. However, privacy parameter values are difficult to choose for two main reasons. First, the theoretical upper bound on privacy loss $(\\epsilon,\\delta)$ might be loose, depending on the chosen sensitivity and data distribution of practical datasets. Second, legal requirements and societal norms for anonymization often refer to individual identifiability, to which $(\\epsilon,\\delta)$ are only indirectly related. We transform $(\\epsilon,\\delta)$ to a bound on the Bayesian posterior belief of the adversary assumed by differential privacy concerning the presence of any record in the training dataset. The bound holds for multidimensional queries under composition, and we show that it can be tight in practice. Furthermore, we derive an identifiability bound, which relates the adversary assumed in differential privacy to previous work on membership inference adversaries. We formulate an implementation of this differential privacy adversary that allows data scientists to audit model training and compute empirical identifiability scores and empirical $(\\epsilon,\\delta)$.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.02913v3","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.02913v3.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"quantifying-identifiability-to-choose-and","repo_url":"https://github.com/SAP-samples/security-research-identifiability-in-dpdl","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"tf","reach":null},{"paper_slug":"quantifying-identifiability-to-choose-and","repo_url":"https://github.com/SAP-samples/security-research-dp-hierarchical-text","is_official":0,"mentioned_in_paper":0,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"tf","reach":null}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"machine-learning","task_name":"BIG-bench Machine Learning"},{"task_slug":"inference-attack","task_name":"Inference Attack"}],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":null,"atlas_url":null,"mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":null,"reason":"arxiv_id_not_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"by_repo":[{"repo":"SAP-samples/security-research-identifiability-in-dpdl","kind":"official","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0},{"repo":"SAP-samples/security-research-dp-hierarchical-text","kind":"listed","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0}],"by_repo_is":"one row per repository in the archive's code links, Syntology's graph links or the samples; samples 0 means no sample is linked to this paper, a statement about Syntology's coverage, not about the repository: with harvested_for_other_papers present, Syntology harvested the repository for that many other papers, and without it, Syntology harvested nothing from it; placed_by_identical_code counts samples whose link records no repository, placed here because identical code was harvested from this repository for another paper; ran counts executions on a synthesized input and instrument counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code"},"code_links_note":null,"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null,"record_sha256":"2cb63c4a9a681bfff666f34835bfeaff5e65a7b385baeb87b93f9b387a96e1b2","record_changed_at":"2026-09-28","record_changed_at_basis":"first_hashed"}