{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/one-for-one-or-all-for-all-equilibria-and","title":"One for One, or All for All: Equilibria and Optimality of Collaboration in Federated Learning","arxiv_id":"2103.03228","date":"2021-03-04","proceeding":null,"authors":["Avrim Blum","Nika Haghtalab","Richard Lanas Phillips","Han Shao"],"abstract":"In recent years, federated learning has been embraced as an approach for bringing about collaboration across large populations of learning agents. However, little is known about how collaboration protocols should take agents' incentives into account when allocating individual resources for communal learning in order to maintain such collaborations. Inspired by game theoretic notions, this paper introduces a framework for incentive-aware learning and data sharing in federated learning. Our stable and envy-free equilibria capture notions of collaboration in the presence of agents interested in meeting their learning objectives while keeping their own sample collection burden low. For example, in an envy-free equilibrium, no agent would wish to swap their sampling burden with any other agent and in a stable equilibrium, no agent would wish to unilaterally reduce their sampling burden. In addition to formalizing this framework, our contributions include characterizing the structural properties of such equilibria, proving when they exist, and showing how they can be computed. Furthermore, we compare the sample complexity of incentive-aware collaboration with that of optimal collaboration when one ignores agents' incentives.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.03228v1","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.03228v1.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"one-for-one-or-all-for-all-equilibria-and","repo_url":"https://github.com/rlphilli/Collaborative-Incentives","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"pytorch","reach":{"status":"unanswered"}}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"all","task_name":"All"},{"task_slug":"federated-learning","task_name":"Federated Learning"}],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":"https://syntology.ai/paper/2103.03228","atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2103.03228","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":true,"reason":"arxiv_id_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"agent_calls":[{"tool":"get_citation_path","arguments":{"paper_1":"2103.03228"},"arguments_in":{"paper_2":"another paper's arXiv id or title"},"call":"get_citation_path(paper_1=\"2103.03228\", paper_2=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_concepts_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2103.03228"},"call":"get_concepts_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2103.03228\")"}],"by_repo":[{"repo":"rlphilli/Collaborative-Incentives","kind":"official","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0}],"by_repo_is":"one row per repository in the archive's code links, Syntology's graph links or the samples; samples 0 means no sample is linked to this paper, a statement about Syntology's coverage, not about the repository: with harvested_for_other_papers present, Syntology harvested the repository for that many other papers, and without it, Syntology harvested nothing from it; placed_by_identical_code counts samples whose link records no repository, placed here because identical code was harvested from this repository for another paper; ran counts executions on a synthesized input and instrument counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code"},"code_links_note":null,"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null,"record_sha256":"3a6c8a06c449157021450091b1a050e3e69fffba270a350fa0fd00b0ea0fa073","record_changed_at":"2026-09-28","record_changed_at_basis":"first_hashed"}