{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/jailbroken-how-does-llm-safety-training-fail","title":"Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?","arxiv_id":"2307.02483","date":"2023-07-05","proceeding":"NeurIPS 2023 11","authors":[],"abstract":"Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of \"jailbreak\" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.02483v1","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2307.02483v1.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"jailbroken-how-does-llm-safety-training-fail","repo_url":"https://github.com/cassidylaidlaw/hidden-context","is_official":0,"mentioned_in_paper":0,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"pytorch","reach":null}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"red-teaming","task_name":"Red Teaming"}],"methods":[{"method_slug":"absolute-position-encodings","method_name":"Absolute Position Encodings"},{"method_slug":"adam","method_name":"Adam"},{"method_slug":"attention","method_name":"Attention"},{"method_slug":"bpe","method_name":"BPE"},{"method_slug":"dense-connections","method_name":"Dense Connections"},{"method_slug":"dropout","method_name":"Dropout"},{"method_slug":"gpt-4","method_name":"GPT-4"},{"method_slug":"hoc","method_name":"HOC"},{"method_slug":"label-smoothing","method_name":"Label Smoothing"},{"method_slug":"layer-normalization","method_name":"Layer Normalization"},{"method_slug":"linear-layer","method_name":"Linear Layer"},{"method_slug":"multi-head-attention","method_name":"Multi-Head Attention"},{"method_slug":"position-wise-feed-forward-layer","method_name":"Position-Wise Feed-Forward Layer"},{"method_slug":"residual-connection","method_name":"Residual Connection"},{"method_slug":"softmax","method_name":"Softmax"},{"method_slug":"transformer","method_name":"Transformer"}],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":"https://syntology.ai/paper/2307.02483","atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2307.02483","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":true,"reason":"arxiv_id_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"agent_calls":[{"tool":"get_citation_path","arguments":{"paper_1":"2307.02483"},"arguments_in":{"paper_2":"another paper's arXiv id or title"},"call":"get_citation_path(paper_1=\"2307.02483\", paper_2=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_concepts_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2307.02483"},"call":"get_concepts_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2307.02483\")"}],"by_repo":[{"repo":"cassidylaidlaw/hidden-context","kind":"listed","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0,"harvested_for_other_papers":2,"harvested_for":["2312.08358","2603.20206"],"harvested_for_calls":[{"arxiv_id":"2312.08358","tool":"get_harvested_code_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2312.08358"},"call":"get_harvested_code_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2312.08358\")"},{"arxiv_id":"2603.20206","tool":"get_harvested_code_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2603.20206"},"call":"get_harvested_code_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2603.20206\")"}]}],"by_repo_harvested_for_is":"harvested_for: the arXiv ids (as Syntology's graph holds them) of every paper whose samples Syntology's graph links to this repository, in arXiv-id order, complete; the page names the first 3 and says how many more. 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