Papers › Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Time

Evasion Attacks against Machine Learning at Test Time

21 Aug 2017arXiv:1708.06131archive 2025-07-28

Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Srndic, Pavel Laskov, Giorgio Giacinto, Fabio Roli

In security-sensitive applications, the success of machine learning depends on a thorough vetting of their resistance to adversarial data. In one pertinent, well-motivated attack scenario, an adversary may attempt to evade a deployed system at test time by carefully manipulating attack samples. In this work, we present a simple but effective gradient-based approach that can be exploited to systematically assess the security of several, widely-used classification algorithms against evasion attacks. Following a recently proposed framework for security evaluation, we simulate attack scenarios that exhibit different risk levels for the classifier by increasing the attacker's knowledge of the system and her ability to manipulate attack samples. This gives the classifier designer a better picture of the classifier performance under evasion attacks, and allows him to perform a more informed model selection (or parameter setting). We evaluate our approach on the relevant security task of malware detection in PDF files, and show that such systems can be easily evaded. We also sketch some countermeasures suggested by our analysis.

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Koukyosyumei/AIJack mentioned on GitHubpytorchSyntology: no sample linked to this paper (harvested for another paper). Syntology's graph links these samples to Federated Optimization in Heterogeneous Networks (arXiv:1812.06127; that paper's own run record: 15 ran (of which 6 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 15 with no instrument failure: 2 honoured, 0 violated, 13 with no contract checked; 0 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 11 unverified), Label Leakage and Protection in Two-party Split Learning (arXiv:2102.08504; that paper's own run record: 1 ran (of which 0 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 0 with no instrument failure: 0 honoured, 0 violated, 0 with no contract checked; 1 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 0 unverified) and See through Gradients: Image Batch Recovery via GradInversion (arXiv:2104.07586; that paper's own run record: 12 ran (of which 1 constructed an object rather than computing a result; 5 with no instrument failure: 4 honoured, 0 violated, 1 with no contract checked; 7 where Syntology's instrument failed) · 1 unverified); nothing checks that they implement this paper's method. report

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BIG-bench Machine LearningMalware DetectionModel Selection

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