{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/do-you-really-follow-me-adversarial","title":"Evaluating the Instruction-Following Robustness of Large Language Models to Prompt Injection","arxiv_id":"2308.10819","date":"2023-08-17","proceeding":null,"authors":["Zekun Li","Baolin Peng","Pengcheng He","Xifeng Yan"],"abstract":"Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.10819v3","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2308.10819v3.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"do-you-really-follow-me-adversarial","repo_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/adv-instruct-eval","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"none","reach":null},{"paper_slug":"do-you-really-follow-me-adversarial","repo_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"none","reach":{"status":"ok"}}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"instruction-following","task_name":"Instruction Following"}],"methods":[{"method_slug":"focus","method_name":"Focus"}],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":"https://syntology.ai/paper/2308.10819","atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2308.10819","mcp":{"get_harvested_code_for_paper":{"arxiv_id":"2308.10819"},"calls":[{"tool":"get_harvested_code_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2308.10819"},"returns":"the samples harvested from this paper, each with its run record; it does not verify the paper"},{"tool":"get_code","arguments_in":"samples[].code_sha256","returns":"one stored sample by its code_sha256; not shown on this site"}]},"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":true,"reason":"in_graph_layer","checked_against":null,"agent_calls":[{"tool":"get_harvested_code_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2308.10819"},"call":"get_harvested_code_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2308.10819\")"},{"tool":"get_code","arguments_in":{"code_sha256":"syntology.samples[].code_sha256"},"call":"get_code(code_sha256=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_citation_path","arguments":{"paper_1":"2308.10819"},"arguments_in":{"paper_2":"another paper's arXiv id or title"},"call":"get_citation_path(paper_1=\"2308.10819\", paper_2=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_concepts_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2308.10819"},"call":"get_concepts_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2308.10819\")"}],"by_repo":[{"repo":"leezekun/adv-instruct-eval","kind":"official","samples":1,"ran":1,"instrument":0,"unverified":0},{"repo":"leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","kind":"official","samples":4,"ran":3,"instrument":1,"unverified":1}],"by_repo_is":"one row per repository in the archive's code links, Syntology's graph links or the samples; samples 0 means no sample is linked to this paper, a statement about Syntology's coverage, not about the repository: with harvested_for_other_papers present, Syntology harvested the repository for that many other papers, and without it, Syntology harvested nothing from it; placed_by_identical_code counts samples whose link records no repository, placed here because identical code was harvested from this repository for another paper; ran counts executions on a synthesized input and instrument counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code","read_at":"2026-10-05T00:36:11+00:00","read_at_is":"when the build read Syntology's graph, not when any sample ran","ran_record":{"url":"https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2308.10819.json","schema":"syntology.ran_record/1","counts_crosswalk":{"n_samples":"syntology.counts.lifted","n_ran":"syntology.counts.executed","n_ran_checked":"syntology.counts.checked","n_instrument":"syntology.counts.instrument_failures","n_unverified":"syntology.counts.no_recorded_run"},"note":"live record, measured at request time; may be newer than this page's graph read","badge":"https://syntology.ai/api/ran/2308.10819.svg"},"claim":"Per-sample execution status on synthesized fixtures; not a correctness claim about the paper. Samples come from repositories linked to the paper, official or community; repo_kind says which.","repos":[{"provenance":"external:paperswithcode_snapshot_2025-07-28","url":"https://github.com/leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","reach":{"status":"ok"}},{"provenance":"external:paperswithcode_snapshot_2025-07-28","url":"https://github.com/leezekun/adv-instruct-eval","reach":null}],"summary":{"ran_violates":3,"ran_draft_wrong":1,"unverified":1},"n_samples":5,"n_ran":4,"n_constructed":0,"n_ran_checked":3,"n_instrument":1,"n_unverified":1,"n_instrument_is":"failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code","every_run_is_an_instrument_failure":false,"key_notes":{"n_ran_checked":"legacy name, kept unchanged so existing readers do not break: it counts the samples that ran with no instrument failure (honoured, violated, and ran with no contract checked); it does not mean a contract was checked, and the pages print it as 'K with no instrument failure', not 'K checked'","n_constructed":"a sub-count of the samples that ran, never subtracted from them and never a failure: an executed sample whose run returned an instance of its own class (fixture_out_type equals the entry name): the run built an object and did not compute a result (Syntology's RAN record, counts.constructed)"},"by_repo_kind":{"official":{"samples":5,"ran":4,"n_ran_checked":3,"n_instrument":1,"repositories":2}},"repo_kind_vocabulary":{"official":"The archive marks this repository official for the paper","named_in_paper":"The archive records that the paper mentions this repository; it is not marked official","listed":"In the archive's code links for this paper, not marked official and not recorded as mentioned in the paper","found_in_text":"Syntology found this repository in the paper's own text; whether it is the authors' implementation is not asserted","community":"Not in the archive's code links for this paper; a community repository Syntology harvested"},"n_pointer_only_for_licence":5,"inline_ok_is":"inline_ok is true only when both licence gates allow Syntology to serve this code's text: this paper's link (inline_ok_link, from the licence of this paper's copy) and the stored copy of the same code that Syntology serves, which may have been first harvested from another repository. withheld_clause is Syntology's own wording of which gate keeps the text a pointer and why, and is null when inline_ok is true. This site shows no code text either way; n_pointer_only_for_licence counts samples with inline_ok false (both gates), n_pointer_only_link_allows those of them whose inline_ok_link is true","n_pointer_only_link_allows":0,"fixture_fields_is":{"signature_and_fixture_out_type":"the arguments Syntology's fixture called the sample with, each as name:type/rank/element kind (? where none was recorded), and the type of what the fixture's run returned, exactly as the harness recorded them; the arguments and the returned type were recorded by two separate runs of the same fixture. No output value is shown, and a returned type says nothing about whether the output was right","level_recorded_at":"when Syntology's graph wrote the sample's verification level, not when the code executed; absent where the level was written before the date was kept, and never filled in with the build date","present_on":"samples that ran only; a key is absent, never empty, where the graph records nothing"},"n_ran_with_level_date":2,"n_ran_without_level_date":2,"n_ran_signature_not_shown":0,"levels_written_between":{"first":"2026-09-22","last":"2026-09-22","is":"the first and last UTC dates on which Syntology's graph wrote a verification level for a sample on this page that ran, not when the code executed"},"code_page_min_papers":5,"code_page_is":"a page for the entry name across every paper's harvested code; the name is a string, not an identity","samples":[{"code_sha256":"bf75673211903e14","code_sha256_prefix":"bf75673211903e14","entry":"exact_match_score","repo":"leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","repo_kind":"official","path":"qa_utils.py","file_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval/blob/HEAD/qa_utils.py","link_basis":"plan_row","language":"python","status":"ran_violates","verification_level":1,"contract_check":"VIOLATES","metamorphic_tier":"deterministic","behaviour_fingerprint":true,"signature":"prediction:str/0/str, ground_truth:str/0/str","fixture_out_type":"bool","level_recorded_at":"2026-09-22T14:31:46.068493+00:00","retrieve_with":{"tool":"get_code","code_sha256":"bf75673211903e14"},"code_page":"/code/exact-match-score","census":null,"licence":"NONE","inline_ok":false,"inline_ok_link":false,"withheld_clause":"GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval when it was checked","mcp_get_code":{"code_sha256":"bf75673211903e14"}},{"code_sha256":"e7e75981cb464788","code_sha256_prefix":"e7e75981cb464788","entry":"normalize_answer","repo":"leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","repo_kind":"official","path":"qa_utils.py","file_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval/blob/HEAD/qa_utils.py","link_basis":"plan_row","language":"python","status":"ran_draft_wrong","verification_level":1,"contract_check":"OUTPUT_MISDECLARED","metamorphic_tier":"deterministic","behaviour_fingerprint":true,"signature":"s:str/0/str","fixture_out_type":"str","retrieve_with":{"tool":"get_code","code_sha256":"e7e75981cb464788"},"code_page":"/code/normalize-answer","census":null,"licence":"NONE","inline_ok":false,"inline_ok_link":false,"withheld_clause":"GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval when it was checked","mcp_get_code":{"code_sha256":"e7e75981cb464788"}},{"code_sha256":"7d7caebd5329a4fc","code_sha256_prefix":"7d7caebd5329a4fc","entry":"recall_score","repo":"leezekun/adv-instruct-eval","repo_kind":"official","path":"llm_utils.py","file_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/adv-instruct-eval/blob/HEAD/llm_utils.py","link_basis":"first_harvest_node","language":"python","status":"ran_violates","verification_level":1,"contract_check":"VIOLATES","metamorphic_tier":"deterministic","behaviour_fingerprint":true,"signature":"prediction:str/0/str, ground_truth:str/0/str","fixture_out_type":"bool","level_recorded_at":"2026-09-22T14:31:46.068493+00:00","retrieve_with":{"tool":"get_code","code_sha256":"7d7caebd5329a4fc"},"code_page":null,"census":null,"licence":"NONE","inline_ok":false,"inline_ok_link":false,"withheld_clause":"GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, leezekun/adv-instruct-eval when it was checked","mcp_get_code":{"code_sha256":"7d7caebd5329a4fc"}},{"code_sha256":"7c508037b40522af","code_sha256_prefix":"7c508037b40522af","entry":"str2bool","repo":"leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","repo_kind":"official","path":"qa_utils.py","file_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval/blob/HEAD/qa_utils.py","link_basis":"harvester_set","language":"python","status":"ran_violates","verification_level":1,"contract_check":"VIOLATES","metamorphic_tier":"deterministic","behaviour_fingerprint":false,"signature":"v:str/0/str","fixture_out_type":"bool","code_page":"/code/str2bool","census":null,"licence":"NONE","inline_ok":false,"inline_ok_link":false,"withheld_clause":"GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval when it was checked","mcp_get_code":{"code_sha256":"7c508037b40522af"}},{"code_sha256":"3d1f5cfe9ea15031","code_sha256_prefix":"3d1f5cfe9ea15031","entry":"load_hf_model","repo":"leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval","repo_kind":"official","path":"llm_utils.py","file_url":"https://github.com/leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval/blob/HEAD/llm_utils.py","link_basis":"first_harvest_node","language":"python","status":"unverified","verification_level":0,"contract_check":null,"metamorphic_tier":null,"behaviour_fingerprint":false,"code_page":null,"census":null,"licence":"NONE","inline_ok":false,"inline_ok_link":false,"withheld_clause":"GitHub detected no licence in this paper's repository, leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval when it was checked","mcp_get_code":{"code_sha256":"3d1f5cfe9ea15031"}}]},"code_links_note":null,"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null,"record_sha256":"c3c689679c4755a57dd1cd008f6220050d8ae0cb693332886955ae178307a8a2","record_changed_at":"2026-09-28","record_changed_at_basis":"first_hashed"}