{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/defending-neural-backdoors-via-generative","title":"Defending Neural Backdoors via Generative Distribution Modeling","arxiv_id":"1910.04749","date":"2019-10-10","proceeding":"NeurIPS 2019 12","authors":["Ximing Qiao","Yukun Yang","Hai Li"],"abstract":"Neural backdoor attack is emerging as a severe security threat to deep learning, while the capability of existing defense methods is limited, especially for complex backdoor triggers. In the work, we explore the space formed by the pixel values of all possible backdoor triggers. An original trigger used by an attacker to build the backdoored model represents only a point in the space. It then will be generalized into a distribution of valid triggers, all of which can influence the backdoored model. Thus, previous methods that model only one point of the trigger distribution is not sufficient. Getting the entire trigger distribution, e.g., via generative modeling, is a key to effective defense. However, existing generative modeling techniques for image generation are not applicable to the backdoor scenario as the trigger distribution is completely unknown. In this work, we propose max-entropy staircase approximator (MESA), an algorithm for high-dimensional sampling-free generative modeling and use it to recover the trigger distribution. We also develop a defense technique to remove the triggers from the backdoored model. Our experiments on Cifar10/100 dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of MESA in modeling the trigger distribution and the robustness of the proposed defense method.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/1910.04749v2","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.04749v2.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"defending-neural-backdoors-via-generative","repo_url":"https://github.com/superrrpotato/Defending-Neural-Backdoors-via-Generative-Distribution-Modeling","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"pytorch","reach":{"status":"unanswered"}}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"backdoor-attack","task_name":"Backdoor Attack"},{"task_slug":"image-generation","task_name":"Image Generation"},{"task_slug":null,"task_name":"valid"}],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":"https://syntology.ai/paper/1910.04749","atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=1910.04749","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":true,"reason":"arxiv_id_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"agent_calls":[{"tool":"get_citation_path","arguments":{"paper_1":"1910.04749"},"arguments_in":{"paper_2":"another paper's arXiv id or title"},"call":"get_citation_path(paper_1=\"1910.04749\", paper_2=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_concepts_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"1910.04749"},"call":"get_concepts_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"1910.04749\")"}],"by_repo":[{"repo":"superrrpotato/Defending-Neural-Backdoors-via-Generative-Distribution-Modeling","kind":"official","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0}],"by_repo_is":"one row per repository in the archive's code links, Syntology's graph links or the samples; samples 0 means no sample is linked to this paper, a statement about Syntology's coverage, not about the repository: with harvested_for_other_papers present, Syntology harvested the repository for that many other papers, and without it, Syntology harvested nothing from it; placed_by_identical_code counts samples whose link records no repository, placed here because identical code was harvested from this repository for another paper; ran counts executions on a synthesized input and instrument counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code"},"code_links_note":null,"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null,"record_sha256":"befdb099ea55b91359ae4b8e0df0ef7658870c6d6ffdf7fbe94fb997c1e4c9db","record_changed_at":"2026-09-28","record_changed_at_basis":"first_hashed"}