{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/defending-against-indirect-prompt-injection","title":"Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlighting","arxiv_id":"2403.14720","date":"2024-03-20","proceeding":null,"authors":["Keegan Hines","Gary Lopez","Matthew Hall","Federico Zarfati","Yonatan Zunger","Emre Kiciman"],"abstract":"Large Language Models (LLMs), while powerful, are built and trained to process a single text input. In common applications, multiple inputs can be processed by concatenating them together into a single stream of text. However, the LLM is unable to distinguish which sections of prompt belong to various input sources. Indirect prompt injection attacks take advantage of this vulnerability by embedding adversarial instructions into untrusted data being processed alongside user commands. Often, the LLM will mistake the adversarial instructions as user commands to be followed, creating a security vulnerability in the larger system. We introduce spotlighting, a family of prompt engineering techniques that can be used to improve LLMs' ability to distinguish among multiple sources of input. The key insight is to utilize transformations of an input to provide a reliable and continuous signal of its provenance. We evaluate spotlighting as a defense against indirect prompt injection attacks, and find that it is a robust defense that has minimal detrimental impact to underlying NLP tasks. Using GPT-family models, we find that spotlighting reduces the attack success rate from greater than {50}\\% to below {2}\\% in our experiments with minimal impact on task efficacy.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.14720v1","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2403.14720v1.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"defending-against-indirect-prompt-injection","repo_url":"https://github.com/microsoft/llmail-inject-challenge","is_official":0,"mentioned_in_paper":0,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"none","reach":{"status":"ok","spdx":"MIT"}}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"prompt-engineering","task_name":"Prompt Engineering"}],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":"https://syntology.ai/paper/2403.14720","atlas_url":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus=2403.14720","mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":true,"reason":"arxiv_id_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"agent_calls":[{"tool":"get_citation_path","arguments":{"paper_1":"2403.14720"},"arguments_in":{"paper_2":"another paper's arXiv id or title"},"call":"get_citation_path(paper_1=\"2403.14720\", paper_2=\"…\")"},{"tool":"get_concepts_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2403.14720"},"call":"get_concepts_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2403.14720\")"}],"by_repo":[{"repo":"microsoft/llmail-inject-challenge","kind":"listed","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0,"harvested_for_other_papers":1,"harvested_for":["2506.09956"],"harvested_for_calls":[{"arxiv_id":"2506.09956","tool":"get_harvested_code_for_paper","arguments":{"arxiv_id":"2506.09956"},"call":"get_harvested_code_for_paper(arxiv_id=\"2506.09956\")"}]}],"by_repo_harvested_for_is":"harvested_for: the arXiv ids (as Syntology's graph holds them) of every paper whose samples Syntology's graph links to this repository, in arXiv-id order, complete; the page names the first 3 and says how many more. A link only: it does not say the papers are the same work, that one copied the other, or that the code implements this paper's method; harvested_for_calls gives the get_harvested_code_for_paper call for each arXiv-shaped id among them","by_repo_is":"one row per repository in the archive's code links, Syntology's graph links or the samples; samples 0 means no sample is linked to this paper, a statement about Syntology's coverage, not about the repository: with harvested_for_other_papers present, Syntology harvested the repository for that many other papers, and without it, Syntology harvested nothing from it; placed_by_identical_code counts samples whose link records no repository, placed here because identical code was harvested from this repository for another paper; ran counts executions on a synthesized input and instrument counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code"},"code_links_note":null,"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null,"record_sha256":"4003bca470b18c3687959ff2ce0f66d2a10363f619d3253c64016e95dec7c718","record_changed_at":"2026-09-28","record_changed_at_basis":"first_hashed"}