{"about":{"non_affiliation":"Code with Papers and Syntology are not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Papers with Code, Meta, or the pwc-archive mirror.","site":"https://codewithpapers.app","licence":"CC BY-SA 4.0","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","attribution":"https://codewithpapers.app/attribution","modified":"archive material modified by Syntology; see the attribution page","syntology":{"site":"https://syntology.ai","developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","mcp":{"server":"https://syntology.ai/mcp","transport":"streamable-http","server_card":"https://syntology.ai/.well-known/mcp/server-card.json","auth":{"type":"trial token, no account","trial_token":"https://syntology.ai/api/oauth/trial/token","method":"POST","docs":"https://syntology.ai/developers"}},"have":"https://syntology.ai/api/graph/have?x=<method, arXiv id or title> (free, answers coverage only)","paper_base":"https://syntology.ai/paper/","atlas_base":"https://app.syntology.ai/?focus="},"machine_readable":[{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/llms.txt","what":"the machine catalog: every machine-readable file, counted"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/index/manifest.json","what":"paper-to-code index by arXiv id, with Syntology's counts"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/search/manifest.json","what":"site search index (titles, authors) and its files"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/download","what":"bulk files: Syntology's layer, described there"},{"url":"https://codewithpapers.app/build_manifest.json","what":"the build record: inputs, counts, exclusions, probes"}]},"url":"/paper/an-approach-to-generalizing-some","title":"Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting","arxiv_id":"2208.06907","date":"2022-08-14","proceeding":null,"authors":["Wesley H. Holliday","Chase Norman","Eric Pacuit","Saam Zahedian"],"abstract":"A fundamental principle of individual rational choice is Sen's $\\gamma$ axiom, also known as expansion consistency, stating that any alternative chosen from each of two menus must be chosen from the union of the menus. Expansion consistency can also be formulated in the setting of social choice. In voting theory, it states that any candidate chosen from two fields of candidates must be chosen from the combined field of candidates. An important special case of the axiom is binary expansion consistency, which states that any candidate chosen from an initial field of candidates and chosen in a head-to-head match with a new candidate must also be chosen when the new candidate is added to the field, thereby ruling out spoiler effects. In this paper, we study the tension between this weakening of expansion consistency and weakenings of resoluteness, an axiom demanding the choice of a single candidate in any election. As is well known, resoluteness is inconsistent with basic fairness conditions on social choice, namely anonymity and neutrality. Here we prove that even significant weakenings of resoluteness, which are consistent with anonymity and neutrality, are inconsistent with binary expansion consistency. The proofs make use of SAT solving, with the correctness of a SAT encoding formally verified in the Lean Theorem Prover, as well as a strategy for generalizing impossibility theorems obtained for special types of voting methods (namely majoritarian and pairwise voting methods) to impossibility theorems for arbitrary voting methods. This proof strategy may be of independent interest for its potential applicability to other impossibility theorems in social choice.","url_abs":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.06907v3","url_pdf":"https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.06907v3.pdf","source":{"archive":"pwc-archive (Hugging Face), CC BY-SA 4.0","snapshot":"2025-07-28","licence_url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode","row_kind":"abstracts"},"code_links":[{"paper_slug":"an-approach-to-generalizing-some","repo_url":"https://github.com/szahedian/binary-gamma","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":1,"framework":"none","reach":null},{"paper_slug":"an-approach-to-generalizing-some","repo_url":"https://github.com/chasenorman/verified-encodings-social-choice","is_official":1,"mentioned_in_paper":1,"mentioned_in_github":0,"framework":"none","reach":null}],"tasks":[{"task_slug":"fairness","task_name":"Fairness"}],"methods":[],"datasets_introduced":[],"methods_introduced":[],"results":[],"syntology":{"syntology_url":null,"atlas_url":null,"mcp":null,"developers":"https://syntology.ai/developers","held":null,"reason":"arxiv_id_not_in_atlas","checked_against":{"atlas_ids":549449,"atlas_ids_sha256":"afd72399dafd9906e9062927f70655952385a3d75488558e1f0484e950ab09b7","read_at":"2026-10-05T01:46:21Z"},"by_repo":[{"repo":"szahedian/binary-gamma","kind":"official","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0},{"repo":"chasenorman/verified-encodings-social-choice","kind":"official","samples":0,"ran":0,"instrument":0,"unverified":0}],"by_repo_is":"one row per repository in the archive's code links, Syntology's graph links or the samples; samples 0 means no sample is linked to this paper, a statement about Syntology's coverage, not about the repository: with harvested_for_other_papers present, Syntology harvested the repository for that many other papers, and without it, Syntology harvested nothing from it; placed_by_identical_code counts samples whose link records no repository, placed here because identical code was harvested from this repository for another paper; ran counts executions on a synthesized input and instrument counts failures of Syntology's instrument, not of the code"},"code_links_note":null,"arxiv_metadata":null,"syntology_extracted_results":null,"record_sha256":"2775f6adee91bb8befb966a7b763028192bd110bfc1acd2263d41d6064d2daf9","record_changed_at":"2026-09-28","record_changed_at_basis":"first_hashed"}